My overall reaction is that this is a tired trope. Brian Hagedorn is an evangelical Christian (I am not) and he holds views that evangelicals tend to hold regarding marriage and human sexuality. He is also someone who sees the Constitution as a document that ought to be interpreted in accordance with its text, history and structure (I agree) and not as a vehicle for imposing whatever the judge sees as "justice" or "good policy." If you take that view, decisions like Roe and Lawrence are very hard to justify - no matter how you feel about abortion or homosexuality.

On a general level, I think there are two problems with the increasing tendency to say that certain types of religious people should be excluded from public office or limited in their exercise of the authority of public office because "the dogma" or whatever it gets called lives "too loudly" within them. The first is that it is inconsistent with Constitution's prohibition of religious tests and establishes a regime of religious liberty. The idea of America is that people of different religious understandings could live together and participate in self government. There was to be no requirement of a qualifying orthodoxy and the notion that one can't be a traditional Catholic or Evangelical Christian amounts to the imposition of such an orthodoxy.

Second, Judge Hagedorn would not be required to recuse himself. The key case here is called Republican Party v. White. In that case, which struck down a rule that prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their position on legal or political issues, Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) explored a taxonomy of bias and made clear that having a point of view on a contested matter is not "bias."

As for the particular views expressed here, opposition to same sex marriage was the position of Barack Obama, Hilary Clinton and about 60% of Wisconsin voters in 2006. The issue is no longer open for review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court because of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell.

Nor can the Wisconsin Supreme Court depart from decisions like Roe and Lawrence. But the idea that these decisions are constitutionally problematic is widely held. The problem is that nothing in the Constitution addresses abortion or sexual relationships. Nothing in the Constitution even establishes a general right of privacy in the sense of being left alone. The Supreme Court hasn't adequately explained where these rights are to be found, resulting, for awhile in a cottage industry for law professors who tried to offer the rationale that the Court did not. To say, as Justice Kennedy did in Casey, that there is some extra textual right to define the mystery of one's existence is unsatisfying because it has no logical boundaries. Decisions like Roe, Lawrence and Obergefell are troubling because, even if we like the particular outcome, they provide judges with broad authority to undo democratic decision making. The legal criticism of these decisions is not so much about their outcome, but about who decides. Judges or legislators?

Thus, the point he's making about Lawrence is not that gay relationships are like bestiality. It's clear from the context that he does not think that (he thinks the law in Texas was not prudent) but that the principle that constitutionalizes the issue has no logical stopping point. If you have a constitutional right to sexual self-expression, why might it not be extended to other forms of expression. A legislature can draw that line because it can make ad hoc decisions but courts rule by abstract principle and have to try to apply them consistently.

People who are pro-life tend to have a sour view of Planned Parenthood because, notwithstanding its claims to the contrary, it is very much an organization about abortion. But a judge can oppose a group - say the National Rifle Association or Center for Immigration Studies - and still be able to recognize its legal rights.

I think Brian is a well-trained and careful lawyer who understands the difference between his religious and political views and what the law requires. To deny that any such distinction exists is a bad faith reading of what he wrote and fundamentally misunderstands the role of courts and judges.

So I'd say this stuff is not particularly relevant.